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COMMENT.
A much mooted question has been decided by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in Dolson v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern
Ry. Co., 87 N. W. 629.
The action was brought by the administrator of a deceased
brakeman, who was severely injured in a collision and died as a re-
sult of his injuries, being conscious for a few hours before his
death. The declaration contained two counts; one under the "sur-
vivor act," so-called, and the other under the "death act." The
former is a general provision that all causes of action for negligent
injuries shall survive, while the latter is a special statute to the effect
that in cases of death caused by negligence the personal representa-
tive may bring an action for benefit of widow or next of kin.
The question presented to the Court was whether the plaintiff
was entitled to recover under both the "death act" and the "survivor
act," and the majority of the Court decided that the plaintiff could
not recover under both acts but that since the death was not instan-
taneous his remedy was under the "survivor act."
The situation presented in this case has proved most troublesome
to the courts of all states where similar statutes exist. To quote the
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dissenting justice, "No legal question has been brought to my atten-
tion recently in which there is more conflict in the decisions of the
courts. The opinions are contradictory, and it would be difficult to
reconcile them with each other."
This whole subject was discussed in an able and exhaustive man-
ner in a series of articles entitled "Statutory Liability for Causing
Death," which appeared in 28 Am. Law. Reg. (N. S.) 385,513,577,
published in 1889. The learned author, after reviewing and ana-
lyzing nearly all the cases which had been decided up to the time
the articles were written, expressed his conviction that the true doc-
trine was, that where there is, in addition to the special act ("Death
Act"), a general provision of law making rights of action for injury
to the person survive, two actions will be maintainable after death,
one representing the family's cause of action, the other the injured
person's cause of action. This doctrine is diametrically opposed to
that which the Michigan court is endeavoring to establish. A re-
view of the cases decided since these articles were published tend
to confirm the opinion of the author.
In Arkansas it has been held that the general statute providing
for the survival of the common-law cause of action was not repealed
by the subsequent enactment giving the personal representative of the
injured party a new cause of action for benefit of widow, but that
both causes of action exist and a recovery in a suit based upon one
will not bar a recovery in a suit founded on the other. Davis v.
St. Louis R. R. Co., 53 Ark. 117.
In Kansas, where the contrary doctrine was thought to be firmly
established by Martin v. Railroad, 58 Kan. 475, court has overruled
the Martin case and declared that two causes of action exist. Rail-
road v. Bennett, 5 Kan. App. 231. The Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin in a recent case, after a thorough examination of authorities,
confirms the decision of the Kansas Appellate Court. Brown v.
Chicago Railroad, 102 Wis. 137.
A like conclusion has been reached in Pennsylvania. Birch v.
.Pittsburg Railroad, 165 Pa. St. 339.
In Vermont the case of Legg v. Britton, 64 Vt. 652, would seem
at first blush to confirm the Michigan doctrine, but upon closer ex-
amination it is apparent that the Court decided against the right of
the administrator to bring an action in favor of the widow because
he had already recovered damages upon an action started by the in-
testate before his death. Under such a state of facts the Court of
all States have uniformly held that but one cause of action exists.
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Birch v. Pittsburg Railroad, supra. Such a case is analogous to
one in which the intestate accepts compensation for the injury.
Vida Little-wood v. Mayor, 89 N. Y. 24.
This present decision of the Michigan Court is consistent with
that of Sweetland v. Railroad Co., 117 Mich. 329. However, since
the Court was divided three to two in both cases and no three jus-
tices took the same view in either case, it is questionable whether a
definite doctrine can be said to have been established in this State.
LEGAL STATUS OF RAILROAD VOLUNTARY RELIEF DEPARTMENTS.
The increasing importance of the voluntary relief departments of
railroads has necessitated some expression on the part of the courts,
as to their legal status.
These departments were established about fifteen years ago pre-
sumably to place within reach of employ~s an inexpensive form of
life and accident insurance, but more probably for the purpose of
identifying the interests of employer and employ6, rendering him less
likely to antagonize the company during labor difficulties, and of pre-
venting a large percentage of damage suits brought by employ6s or
their representatives.
In determining the rights and liabilities of these concerns, three
legal questions arise: (I) Is voluntary relief business of railroad
companies "insurance business ?" The weight of authority is decid-
edly in the negative. The only decision cited in support of the con-
tention that it is insurance business, is Commonwealth v. Witherbee,
io 5 Mass. 149, decided in 187o, long before the institution of this
class of business. The court there held that "a contract by which
one party for a consideration promises to make a certain payment
of nioney upon the destruction or injury of something in which the
other party has an interest, is a contract of insurance, whatever may
be the terms of payment of the consideration by the assured or the
mode of estimating or securing payment of the sum to be paid by the
insurer in event of loss, and although the object of the insurer in
making the contract is benevolent and not speculative." In John-
son v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co., 163 Pa. St. Ry. it is spe-
cifically stated that a relief association of this nature is not an insur-
ance company, but a beneficial association.
(2) Does a contract with a railroad voluntary relief department
giving the employ6 the option between acceptance of relief and an
action for damages, violate the statute prohibiting corporations from
contracting against their liability for negligence? Although this is
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contended in nearly very action involving such a contract, not a
single decision can be found supporting it. As is said in Johnson v.
Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co. Supra, "The substantial feature of
this contract which distinguishes it from those held void as against
public policy is that the party retains whatever right of action he may
have until after knowledge of all the facts, and an opportunity to
make his choice between the sure benefits of the association or the
chances of ligitation." To the same effect is the decision in Donald
v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co., 93 Iowa 284 and Eckman v. Chicago
B. & Q. R. R. Co., 169 Ill. 312.
(3) What is the effect of a release of the company by the bene-
ficiary of a member? In Miller v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co., 65
Fed. Rep. 305, the acceptance of relief under such a contract was held
not to preclude a suit against the company for damages. In respect
to this contract, defendant was held to be an insurance company, and
having received the premium demanded of plaintiff, the latter was
fully entitled to the benefits which he received, independent of any
question affecting his relations to the railroad company as an em-
ploye. The circuit court of appeals in reviewing the case (40 U. S.
App. 448) although affirming the decision of the lower court on a
demurrer, held such contracts perfectly valid. That the obligation
assumed by the employer to maintain and support such association
by contributing the funds necessary for that purpose creates a privity
of contract between the employer and all the members of the asso-
ciation, and furnishes a sufficient consideration to support such con-
tract, is recognized by innumerable decisions. Ringle v. Penn. R. R.
Co., 104 Pa. St. 529. Spitze v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co,, 75
Md. 162.
In the recent case of Cowen v. Ray, io8 Fed. Rep. 320 in Indiana
the railroad company attempted to prevent the administratrix of a
deceased member of its relief department, who had executed a release
as beneficiary, from bringing an action as administratrix of his
estate in Indiana where such an action is allowed, on the ground that
by its own terms the contract with the relief department was to be
general in its construction and effect by the laws of the state of
Maryland. The court held that it was for the state within whose
limits the negligent act is done, to prescribe when and under what
circumstances a cause of action resulting in death shall arise against
a person or corporation operating within its limits.
From these decisions it seems that the status of a railroad volun-
tary relief department is that of a beneficiary association with power
to maintain a relief system, and to require beneficiaries to choose
between relief benefits and cause of action for damages, and that such
business is not ultra vives the charter of a railroad company nor
opposed to public policy.
